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1. Introduction

The stochastic revealed preference methodology of McFadden and Richter (1990) is a cornerstone of economic analysis. This research agenda aims at explaining the behavior of
a population of decision makers (DMs) as if each DM maximizes her utility, which is an
independent identically distributed draw from a distribution of preferences, over their choice
set (i.e., menus). This theory is usually referred to as random utility model (RUM).1 If RUM
is successful at describing behavior, then the analyst can use it to recover the distribution
of heterogeneous preferences solely from observing the probability of choice of a finite set of
alternatives from different menus justifying the name of revealed preference.2 This distribution of preferences is an important input for many social sciences and can play a key role
in policymaking. However, RUM may fail at describing behavior if DMs do not consider all
available alternatives. This may happen, for instance, if there is a cost to understanding the
decision task. In this situation, DMs may use a two-stage procedure:3 first selecting a subset
of the given menu (consideration set), and only then choosing the best alternative from that
set. Given that there may be latent heterogeneity in DMs preferences, and in how DMs form
consideration sets, from the analyst’s standpoint, both the consideration sets and choices
from these sets are random. As a result of this two-stage procedure, if the consideration set
does not contain the most preferred alternative of a DM, the DM will choose a dominated
alternative, failing to be consistent with RUM.4
1

RUM was originally formulated by Block and Marschak (1960) and Falmagne (1978).
Since Fishburn (1998), it is known that only partial identification of the distribution of preferences is
possible under RUM. The probability of an item being ranked first is uniquely identified (Aguiar et al., 2016).
3
Since Manzini and Mariotti (2007), there has been a renewed interest in studying models of sequential
choice in economics. The main aim of this research is to accommodate context effects that produce violations
of the standard utility maximization framework. In a sequential procedure of choice or a two-stage choice
procedure, the DMs first simplify the original choice problem using some heuristic and then choose rationality
from the simplified choice problem. Limited consideration is just one example of a factor that affects the first
stage, which determines the effective choice set used in the second stage. Other factors may be willpower and
status-quo bias (Horan, 2016).
4
For examples of the distortions created by limited consideration, see Ho et al. (2017) and Heiss et al.
(2016) (the health insurance market), Hortaçsu et al. (2017) (the residential electricity market in Texas),
Honka (2014) and Honka et al. (2017) (the US auto insurance and banking industries), De Los Santos et al.
2
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This paper proposes a generalization of the stochastic revealed preference methodology that is
robust to limited consideration, allows for heterogeneous preferences that can be correlated with
consideration, and is amenable to statistical testing. In doing so, we provide nonparametric
restrictions on limited consideration and preferences that make partial recoverability of the
distribution of preferences possible in a large class of stochastic choice data sets. Similar to
Kitamura and Stoye (2019), our framework also permits robust counterfactual welfare analysis
and out-of-sample predictions.
A large literature, pioneered by Masatlioglu et al. (2012) and Manzini and Mariotti (2014),
has proposed theories of consideration-mediated choice. These theories accommodate some
departures from RUM caused by inattention, feasibility, categorization, and search.5 However,
in contrast to our work, most existing theories of random consideration have assumed that
preferences are homogeneous (Cattaneo et al., 2020). This restriction implies that these
models are not well suited to describe behavior at the population level. Our framework allows
for homogeneous and heterogeneous preferences that may be correlated with consideration,
making it suitable for both experimental and field data sets.
The closest paper to our work is Cattaneo et al. (2020). They provide a general framework,
Random Attention Model (RAM), to test different models of stochastic consideration when
preferences are homogeneous. Therefore, their work is applicable to individual stochastic
choice data. Cattaneo et al. (2020) impose a set-monotonicity restriction on the probability of
considering a set of alternatives given the menu. Namely, they assume that the probability of
considering a given set cannot increase if the menu is getting larger. We study the implications
of imposing this set-monotonicity constraint as well, but we allow for heterogeneous preferences.
Hence, our model is applicable to both individual and population stochastic choice data.
The second assumption we impose is preference stability. This condition requires that the
(2012) (web browsing behavior of consumers when shopping online), Barseghyan et al. (2021) (insurance
purchases).
5
See, for instance, Aguiar et al. (2016), Brady and Rehbeck (2016), Caplin et al. (2016), Aguiar (2017),
Kovach and Ülkü (2020), Lleras et al. (2017), and Horan (2019).

3

marginal distribution of preferences does not depend on the menu. The same stability
assumption is used in McFadden and Richter (1990) and it means that the variation in
menus does not change the preferences of DMs. The stability assumption is satisfied in many
empirical and theoretical settings (see Sections 3 and 4 for further details). Together with
set-monotonicity, it extends the RAM framework to settings with preference heterogeneity
and the RUM framework to settings with limited consideration. Importantly, stability puts no
restrictions on the dependence structure between menus and consideration, is consistent with
statistical dependence between random consideration and random preferences, and together
with set-monotonicity makes our framework testable. We show that none of these assumptions
alone has empirical content, but together they restrict behavior meaningfully and allow for
welfare and counterfactual analysis.
Set-monotonicity and stability are compatible with the behavior of a mixture of DMs, where
each DM’s behavior is consistent with stochastic limited consideration governed by a RAM (i.e.,
requiring set-monotonicity). Under this interpretation, stability requires that the heterogeneity
of preferences of the population of DMs is independent of the choice set, as in the McFadden
and Richter’s (1990) stochastic revealed preference framework.
We also demonstrate that set-monotocity and stability are satisfied by several important models
of limited consideration with heterogeneous preferences, such as a variant of Manzini and
Mariotti’s (2007) model of alternative specific consideration with heterogeneous preferences,
Brady and Rehbecks’s (2016) model of logit attention with random utility, Tversky’s (1972)
model of elimination by aspects, search and satisficing with random search and random utility
(Aguiar et al., 2016), and a version of rational inattention with Shannon’s cost of information
Caplin et al. (2018).6
Our approach differs from previous works that have used enhanced data sets to test for the
presence of consideration. In particular, we only need a standard stochastic choice data
6
Aguiar et al. (2021) considers the same primitives but imposes full independence between random
preferences and attention. In contrast to this paper, Aguiar et al. (2021) requires the presence of a default
alternative and imposes parametric restrictions on the random attention.
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set widely used in the discrete-choice literature.7 Recently, Abaluck and Adams (2021) use
structural restrictions on the elasticity behavior of demand to identify consideration sets and
preferences. We differ from that work because we do not observe attributes (e.g., prices).
Barseghyan et al. (2021) obtain information about parametric distribution of preferences in a
domain with attributes variation by introducing a support restriction on possible consideration
sets. Our framework does not impose any parametric restrictions on the distribution of
preferences, and allows both shape and support restrictions on consideration probabilities.
Kashaev and Lazzati (2021) develop a dynamic model of discrete choice that incorporates
peer effects into random consideration sets. They identify preferences and consideration
probabilities in a fixed menu settings by using variation in choices of peers. We assume menu
variation and do not have access to panel data.
Aguiar r Kashaev (2021) study nonparametric identification and estimation of the distribution
of consideration sets and preferences without menu variation in panel data settings. Dardanoni
et al. (2020b) provide identification of the consideration probabilities given a known distribution
of preferences in a fixed menu. They also consider grouped data sets where three instances of
choice of the same consumers is observed to enhance identification. We assume menu variation,
do not need to know the distribution of preferences, and do not use enriched stochastic choice
data sets. More recently, Dardanoni et al. (2020a) provide identification arguments for both
preferences and cognition heterogeneity (including consideration probabilities) in mixture
data sets. In contrast to our work, their method requires observing the joint distribution of
choice over different menus. Also, their results are focused on parametric heterogeneity.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our general framework. In Section 3,
we provide several justifications of the stability assumption. Section 4 shows that our
framework generalizes several important models of limited consideration. Section 5 provides
7

For examples of enriched data sets that identify limited consideration, see Reutskaja et al. (2011) (eyetracking data); Honka et al. (2017) and Draganska and Klapper (2011) (additional surveys); Kawaguchi et al.
(2016) and Conlon and Mortimer (2013) (variation in product availability); Dehmamy and Otter (2014) and
Huang and Bronnenberg (2018) (variations in quantity purchased and products purchased); and Gabaix et al.
(2006) (mouse-tracking data).
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the characterization of our model which is amenable for statistical testing, and discusses
the computational aspects of our model. Section 6 studies the implications of our model for
preference revelation and counterfactual welfare analysis. Section 7 concludes our paper. All
proofs can be found in Appendix A.

2. Model

Let X be a finite choice set. The collection of choice sets (menus) is denoted by a nonempty
subset of the power set A ⊆ 2X \ {∅}. We define the stochastic choice function ρA ∈ ∆(A),
where ∆(A) denotes the set of all probability distributions on A, for A ∈ A such that ρA (a)
denotes the probability of choosing a ∈ A. The stochastic choice data set is the vector
ρ = (ρA )A∈A . We call a stochastic choice data set complete if A = 2X \ {∅} and incomplete
otherwise.
We let U ⊆ X × X be the set of linear orders (strict preference relations) defined on X. The
typical element will be denoted by ∈ U .
Within our framework, DMs may exhibit limited consideration. DMs exhibit limited consideration when they maximize their preferences in a strict subset of the menu. This strict subset
is called a consideration set. We model limited consideration using the notion of consideration
filters.
Definition 1 (Consideration Filter). We say that φ : 2X \{∅} → 2X is a feasible (consideration)
filter if there exists D ∈ 2X \ {∅} such that




D,

D ⊆ A,



∅,

otherwise

φ(A) = 

6

for all A ∈ 2X \ {∅}.
Let Φ be a finite collection of all feasible filters. The typical element of it will be denoted by
φ ∈ Φ.
We consider a random attention and utility model (RAUM). A behavioral type of this model is
determined by a pair of preferences and filter (, φ) ∈ U × Φ. A RAUM rule π = (πA )A∈2X \{∅}
is a collection of probability distribution over preferences and filters πA ∈ ∆(U × Φ) such that
πA (, φ) = 0 whenever φ(A) = ∅ for all choice sets A ∈ 2X \ {∅}.
Given menu A, let πA (·| ) denote the conditional distribution over filters conditional on
the random preference order being . Then, for φ such that φ(A) = D, πA (φ| ) is the
probability that set D is considered in menu A by DMs with preferences . Essentially,
consideration filters are indexed by all possible consideration sets D: different filters will
generate all subsets of a given menu A.
We work with filters that are indexed by consideration sets because of two main reasons.
First, we think of ρ as coming from repeated cross-sections. (See the experiment in Aguiar
et al., 2021 for an example of a setting where each DM faces a menu at random and has
only one choice instance.) Thus, for a given menu A, DM with filter φ considers φ(A) and a
pair (, φ) completely describes her behavior. For a different menu, a different DM may be
endowed with a different filter and preferences. Second, consideration filters are convenient
since most of the models of limited consideration and assumptions about them are defined in
terms of probabilities of considering a given set D. This greatly simplifies our notation and
mathematical exposition without loss of generality.8
Definition 2. A stochastic choice data set ρ admits a RAUM representation π if

ρA (a) =

X

πA (, φ)1 ( a ∈ φ(A), a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} ) ,

(,φ)∈U ×Φ
8

For example, our RAUM rule is empirically equivalent to another less mathematically convenient rule that
uses alternative behavioral types consisting of a preference and a consideration mapping that maps menus to
their nonempty subsets. See Section 3.
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for all a ∈ A and all A ∈ A.
RAUM is so general that it does not have any empirical content. That is, feasible filters
together with unrestricted (possibly menu dependent) distribution of preferences are permissive
enough to explain any behavior. Hence, without further constraints, it is impossible to falsify
RAUM or to recover the (marginal) distribution of preferences of a population of DMs
(i.e., πA∗ () =

P

φ

πA (, φ)). We impose the following stability constraint on the RAUM

representation π.
Assumption 1 (Stability). There exists π ∗ ∈ ∆(U ) such that πA∗ () = π ∗ () for any
A ∈ 2X \ {∅} and ∈ U .
Note that stability is equivalent to requiring that πA∗ () = πB∗ () for any A, B ∈ 2X \ {∅}
and ∈ U , thus, justifying its name.
One interpretation of stability is that it restricts limited consideration such that the marginal
distribution of preferences of the general RAUM is equivalent to the true distribution of
heterogeneous preferences in the population. The true distribution of preferences is the
distribution on U that controls behavior in the counterfactual situation of absence of limited
consideration. Stability does not require the knowledge of such distribution. Moreover,
our stability assumption is a natural analogue, within our more general framework, of the
assumption of preference stability in the stochastic rationality model of McFadden and Richter
(1990).
Importantly, stability is consistent with stochastic dependence between consideration filters and
random preferences. We only require that the (marginal) distribution of preferences remains
the same across exogenously given menus of alternatives. We further explore limitations of
the stability assumption in the next section (Section 3).
Even under stability, limited consideration has to be further restricted to have empirical bite
as we will show in Proposition 1. Here, we follow Cattaneo et al. (2020) and impose the
following restriction.
8

Assumption 2 (Set-monotonicity). For any , φ, A, and B such that A ⊆ B and φ(A) 6= ∅,
it must be that πA (φ| ) ≥ πB (φ| ).
Set-monotonicity means that the conditional probability of a given filter, φ, conditional on
a preference type, , cannot increase as the menu expands. That is, DMs will pay more
attention to a set when the menu of alternatives is smaller. Intuitively, larger menus have a
higher opportunity cost of consideration. Cattaneo et al. (2020) show that many models of
random consideration satisfy set-monotonicity.
The interaction of set-monotonicity and stability does not imply independence of consideration
and preferences, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 1. Let X = {a, b} and A = {{a}, {b}, {a, b}}. Let a 1 b and b 2 a, and assume
that only two filters below realize with nonzero probability:

φ1 (A) =






{a},

{a} ⊆ A,





∅,

otherwise,

φ2 (A) =






{b},

{b} ⊆ A,





∅,

otherwise.

Consider the following distributions πA (, φ) over the above two preference orders and two
filters for different menus:
πA (, φ)

(1 , φ1 )

(1 , φ2 )

(2 , φ1 )

(2 , φ2 )

{a, b}

1/3

1/6

1/6

1/3

{a}

1/2

0

1/2

0

{b}

0

1/2

0

1/2

Note that πA (1 ) = πA (2 ) = 1/2 for all A. However,
2
X
1
1 1
1
= π{a,b} (1 , φ1 ) 6= π{a,b} (1 )
π{a,b} (i , φ1 ) = · = .
3
2 2
4
i=1

That is, preferences and filters are not independent. Moreover, set-monotonicity is also
9

satisfied. For instance, π{a} (φ1 | 1 ) = 1 ≥ 2/3 = π{a,b} (φ1 | 1 ).
The next proposition qualifies the importance of stability and set-monotonicity working
together. Neither of these restrictions alone are enough for empirical relevance of the model.
However, when they are combined together, the model becomes falsifiable even with limited
menu variation. We see the combination of these two restrictions as a baseline of empirical
content that makes our study empirically meaningful.
Proposition 1. The following statements are true:
(i) Any ρ admits a stable RAUM representation.
(ii) Any ρ admits a set-monotone RAUM representation.
(iii) There exists an incomplete ρ that does not admit a set-monotone and stable RAUM

representation.
Here we provide a sketch of the proof of (iii). We construct an incomplete data set (i.e.,
A 6= 2X \ {∅}) that does not admit a set-monotone and stable RAUM. Let X = {a, b, c, d}
and
A = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}, {a, c, d}, {b, c, d}}.
Suppose the observed ρ is as follows
{a, b}

{a, c}

{b, d}

{a, b, d}

{a, c, d}

{b, c, d}

ρA (a)

1

1

-

0

0

-

ρA (b)

0

-

1

1

-

αb

ρA (c)

-

0

-

-

1

αc

ρA (d)

-

-

0

0

0

αd

where αd > 0. Consider the pair {a, b} and {a, b, d}. From observing ρ{a,b} (b) = 0 and
ρ{a,b,d} (b) = 1, we can conclude that b  d with probability 1 or b and d are never considered
10

together. Similarly, from observing ρ{a,c} (c) = 0 and ρ{a,c,d} (c) = 1, we can make analogous
conclusion about c and d. As a result, the fact that αd > 0 then implies that the probability
of considering the singleton consideration set {d} must be nonzero (otherwise d is either never
considered or dominated by b or c). But the latter is impossible because in menu {b, d} option
d is never chosen. The formal details of the sketch above can be found in Appendix A.1.

3. Stability of Preferences as Structured Heterogeneity in a Population
of Inattentive DMs

The set-monotonicity property is well-understood and justified due to Cattaneo et al. (2020).
Here, we provide several justifications of stability as a reasonable assumption for the RAUM
representation.
One possible interpretation of the set-monotone and stable RAUM representation is that it
represents a mixture of the behavior of a population of DMs, where the behavior of each DM
is consistent with RAM.
Definition 3 (Random Attention Model, RAM, Cattaneo et al., 2020). A stochastic choice
data set ρ admits a RAM representation if there exist a preference order  and a collection of
distributions over consideration filters (an attention rule) λ = (λA, )A∈A ∈ ∆(Φ)|A| , where
|A| is the cardinality of A, such that λA, (φ) = 0 whenever φ(A) = ∅; λA, (φ) ≥ λB, (φ) for
all A, B ∈ A such that A ⊆ B and φ(A) 6= ∅; and

ρA (a) =

X

λA, (φ)1 ( a ∈ φ(A), a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} )

φ

for each A ∈ A.
To better understand the relation between RAM and RAUM, consider the following data
11

generating process for ρ. Fix some distribution over preference orders π ∗ ∈ ∆(U ) and some
collection of attention rules for all possible preference orders {λ }∈U . Every DM draws a
preference order  from π ∗ independently of other DMs, as in the McFadden and Richter
(1990)’s framework. Given the preference order  and attention rule λ , the DM chooses
alternatives from A according to the RAM rule (that induces a probability of choice)

ρA, (a) =

X

λA, (φ)1 ( a ∈ φ(A), a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} ) .

φ

Let ρ be a mixture of the above RAM rules weighted by π ∗ . That is,

ρA (a) =

X

π ∗ ()ρA, (a)



for each A ∈ A. Note that this data set admits a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation π with πA (, φ) = λA, (φ)π ∗ () for all , λ, and A. Moreover, by construction, any ρ
that admits a set-monotone and stable RAUM π is also a mixture of RAM rules induced by
π ∗ and attention rules {πA (·| )}∈U . In other words, the set-monotone and stable RAUM
framework is an extension of the RAM framework to heterogeneous preferences structured as
in the McFadden and Richter (1990)’s framework.
Alternatively, since ρ admits a RUM representation if there exists a distribution over preference
orders π ∗ ∈ ∆(U ) such that

ρA (a) =

X

π ∗ ()1 ( a  b, ∀b ∈ A \ {a} ) ,



we can think of RUM rules as mixtures of RAM rules obtained from particular degenerate
attention rules (i.e., λA, (φ) = 1 ( φ(A) = A )). Hence, the set-monotone and stable RAUM
framework is an extension of the RUM framework to heterogeneous consideration filters, as in
the Cattaneo et al. (2020)’s framework.9
9
Note that this interpretation of the stable and set-monotone RAUM rule means that we could alternatively
and equivalently define our behavioral types as a pair of a preference and a consideration mapping, describing
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It is important to point out that in this generalization of the RAM framework, which allows for
heterogeneous preferences, we use the same stability assumption as in the classical stochastic
revealed preference framework of McFadden and Richter (1990). Kitamura and Stoye (2018)
have given a modern interpretation to this assumption as an exogeneity restriction requiring
preferences and menus to be independent. There are many settings where this assumption
is satisfied: (i) experiments, where the experimenter exogenously varies the menus (Aguiar
et al., 2021); (ii) environments with predetermined choice sets in time (e.g., such as modes of
transport or elections McFadden, 1986); (iii) choice problems with frequently-purchased and
inexpensive products (Lu, 2021).10 Moreover, the stability assumption has been the standard
in decision theory with menu variation since the work of Falmagne (1978).
An important reason why the distribution of preferences is assumed to be independent of
menus is that this restriction allows for well-defined and informative welfare and counterfactual
choice analysis out-of-sample (i.e., in menus that are not part of the data set). This stable
distribution over preferences or types can be interpreted as a true preference distribution.
This follows the tradition of the seminal consideration set papers in assuming that each DM is
endowed with a menu independent strict preference relation (Masatlioglu et al., 2012, Manzini
and Mariotti, 2014, Cattaneo et al., 2020).
The stability assumption may not be suitable for all choice situations. A classical example
arises in survey data, such as the application studied in Kitamura and Stoye (2018). Stability
may fail because income, which determines the budget faced by a DM, may be correlated
with preferences. In these situations, Kitamura and Stoye (2018) suggest using the control
function approach (Blundell and Powell, 2001, Imbens and Newey, 2009) to suitably modify
the stochastic revealed preference framework in McFadden and Richter (1990). A study of
the nonempty consideration sets for each menu. Indeed, following Cattaneo et al. (2020) we can restrict the
consideration mapping to be an attention filter. The attention filter property states that if we remove an item
from a menu that is not in the deterministic consideration set, then the consideration set in the new menu is
the same as the consideration set in the original menu.
10
Note that if there are observable covariates (e.g., product characteristics), then our analysis goes through
after conditioning on such covariates. In that case, stability would require preferences to be independent of
menus conditional on observed covariates.
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the connection between their solution to the problem of endogeneity and our framework is
left for future work.

4. Examples of RAUM

Notwithstanding the apparent restrictiveness of the stability and set-monotonicity assumptions,
RAUM generalizes a wide variety of models of limited consideration and random utility,
allowing for correlation between attention and preferences, as showcased in the next examples.

Attention-index Models

Given , an attention-index η : 2X → R+ such that η (∅) = 0 is a capacity over subsets
of X capturing how enticing they are conditional on a given preference type. The following
models of consideration are examples of rules that are governed by attention-indexes. These
type of models are studied in Aguiar et al. (2021) with an independence assumption between
preferences and consideration. Abaluck and Adams (2021) also uses these type of models
in a different domain with the same independence assumption. Here, we show that models
with an attention-index consideration that depends on heterogeneous preferences admit a
set-monotone and stable RAUM representation.
Example 2 (Attention-index). Assume that there is a vector of random utilities associated
with X, u = (uy )y∈X and a vector of random saliency ξ = (ξ y )y∈X with a menu-independent
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) F(ξ,u) . Moreover, assume that the marginal c.d.f. of
u, Fu , is continuous.11 Let U = {u ∈ R|X| : ∀y, y 0 ∈ X, uy > uy0 ⇐⇒ y  y 0 } be the set of
utility values that imply  (Fishburn, 1998). Then, for every ∈ U , define an attention-index
11

Continuity of Fu implies that uy = uy0 with probability zero for any y 6= y 0 .

14

η as
η (D) =

Z

1 ( u ∈ U ) |{y ∈ D : uy + ξy ≥ κ}| dF(ξ,u) (ξ, u)

for some κ ∈ R.12 The attention index η captures the attractiveness of D by computing the
average cardinality of the set of all alternatives in D that are above a threshold κ.13 Next, we
let πA∗ be defined as
πA∗ ()

=

Z

1 ( u ∈ U ) dFu (u)

for all ∈ U . Finally, for any φ and A such that φ(A) 6= ∅, we define πA (φ| ) as
P

η (φ(A) ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (C ∪ B)

B⊆X\g̃(A)

πA (φ| ) = P

C∈2A \{∅}

P

for a known mapping g̃ : 2X → 2X .
In Example 2, stability holds because the marginal c.d.f. Fu does not depend on the menu. In
the absence of limited consideration, the distribution over preferences π ∗ constitutes a random
utility rule, as in McFadden and Richter (1990). For instance, if |X| = 3, uy = w(y) + y
for some mean-utility function w : X → R, and  is distributed according to the Gumbel
distribution, then the random utility (marginal) takes the logit form and
ew(y2 )
ew(y1 )
,
w(y) ew(y2 ) + ew(y3 )
y∈X e

πA∗ () = P

for all y1 , y2 , y3 ∈ X and ∈ U such that y1  y2  y3 .
Set-monotonicity holds for two important special cases in the literature: (i) the logit attention
model (Brady and Rehbeck, 2016) with g̃(A) = X for all A; (ii) and the elimination by aspects
(Tversky, 1972, Aguiar, 2017) with g̃(A) = A for all A.14 The item-specific attention model
12

The support of the random variables and κ have to be such that η (D) > 0 for all D and .
When κ → −∞ the attention-index converges to |D| and there is no dependence on preferences. This
special case has been explored in Aguiar et al. (2021) in the presence of a default alternative.
14
See Appendix C for additional details about these special cases. Sometimes we have an alternative that
is present in every menu–the default alternative. The eliminations by aspects model is also called Random
Categorization Rule (Aguiar, 2017) when there is a default alternative that always attracts attention.
13

15

(Manzini and Mariotti, 2014) is also another special case (Suleymanov, 2018).15
We highlight that correlation between random saliency and random utility is not restricted
(i.e., F(ξ,u) is unrestricted). Finally, in Example 2, we use the cardinality of the set of salient
alternatives
|{y ∈ D : uy + ξy ≥ κ}|
to construct η (D). However, any other mappings can be used to construct η without the
resulting model deviating from the stable and set-monotone RAUM framework.

Search and Satisficing

The search and satisficing behavioral model (Simon, 1955) is an important example of a model
with dependence between preferences and consideration driven by random utility directly
affecting the way choice sets are formed.
Example 3 (Search and Satisficing). Given a choice set X, let s = (sy )y∈X be a random
search index and u = (uy )y∈X be a random utility with a joint continuous c.d.f. F(s,u) . Similar
to Example 2, the random vector u induces π ∗ such that

πA∗ ()

=

Z

1 ( u ∈ U ) dFu (u)

for all ∈ U . An alternative y1 is searched earlier than y2 if and only if its search index is
bigger (i.e., sy1 ≥ sy2 ). All DMs face a common threshold τ ∈ R, and their preferences are
captured by random utility u. For every ∈ U define πA (·| ) as the conditional distribution
over filters such that πA (φ| ) = 0 if φ(A) = ∅ and for φ(A) 6= ∅

πA (φ| ) =

Z

1 ( u ∈ U , φ(A) = {y ∈ A | 6 ∃y 0 ∈ A : sy < sy0 , uy0 ≥ τ } ) dF(s,u) (s, u),
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In Appendix C, we provide a restriction on g̃ that guarantees set-monotonicity. This condition is satisfied
by all these models.
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where τ ∈ R is a threshold that is common for all DMs. We assume F(s,u) is continuous
to avoid indifference in preferences and to avoid the case that many items are searched
simultaneously. In words, the probability of the consideration set being equal to φ(A) = D is
given by the probability of items in D being searched before the items whose utility value are
above the threshold in a menu. If no item is satisficing, then the whole menu A is searched.
The rule π(, φ) = πA (φ| )πA∗ () from Example 3 is set-monotone because the threshold
is constant and the distribution of the search index does not depend on the menu.16 In
addition, stability is satisfied because the joint distribution of the random utility and the
search index does not depend on the menu. This version of search and satisficing was studied
and characterized by Aguiar et al. (2016). The interpretation of this particular RAUM is
compatible with ρ being generated by the behavior of a population of DMs. Each of these
DMs chooses according to random satisficing behavior (with a fixed distribution of search) as
in Aguiar et al. (2016). The preference heterogeneity is governed by π ∗ .
Correlation between preferences and consideration arises endogenously due to the use of the
utility to stop the search process once a satisficing item is found. Caplin et al. (2011) showed
that search and satisficing behavior, as in our example, can be written as an optimization
problem that produces optimal consideration sets given search costs and expected value of
each alternative. In that sense, correlation between preferences and consideration is the result
of optimizing behavior of DMs.
Set-monotonicity breaks if we allow menu-dependent thresholds (Aguiar and Kimya, 2019) or
menu-dependent search indexes (Aguiar et al., 2016). However, if the threshold is random17 ,
as in Kovach and Ülkü (2020), then set-monotonicity is satisfied if the distribution of the
random threshold is menu independent.
16

This example fits Example 9 in the supplement of Cattaneo et al. (2020). But it is easy to see that a
bigger menu (i.e., B ⊇ A) will only decrease the probability of filter φ (i.e., πB (φ| ) ≤ πA (φ| )).
17
τ becomes random and there is a joint c.d.f. F(τ ,s,u) governing the model.
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Rational Inattention

Caplin et al. (2016) pointed out the relationship between the theory of rational inattention in
discrete choice and the theory of consideration sets. Even though the domain of the theory of
rational inattention as presented in Caplin et al. (2016) is described in a different domain
than the one over which our theory is developed, we show next that some special cases of
the rational inattention model admit a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation. The
first example of this section follows the consumer problem 1 in Caplin et al. (2016), but in
contrast to them, (i) we allow for menu variation, and (ii) we assume that priors change with
the menu in a way consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Example 4 (Rational Inattention). Let X = {a, b, c} be the choice set and the (unobserved)
state space be equal to the choice set Ω = X. Consider an individual DM. Let µ(y), y ∈ X,
be the prior that y is of high quality and the rest of alternatives are of low quality. Without
loss of generality, assume that µ(a) ≥ µ(b) ≥ µ(c). Assume that, given menu A ⊆ X, the
prior belief about the state of the world is updated according to Bayes’ rule. That is, the
prior that y in menu A is of the high quality is µA (y) = µ(y)/

P

y 0 ∈A

µ(y 0 ).

There is a state dependent utility u : X × Ω → {0, 1} such that, u(a, y) = uG if a = y and
otherwise u(a, y) = uB with uG > uB . The DM expends attention effort following Shannon’s
model of rational inattention with a fixed parameter λ > 0.18 For tractability, define a net
payoff of identifying the high-quality item that takes into account the attention effort as
uG − uB
δ = exp
λ




µ(a)
,
µ(c)

δ3∗ = −1 +

− 1.

Define also,

δ1∗ = −3 +

1
,
µ(c)

δ2∗ = −1 +

18

µ(b)
,
µ(c)

δ4∗ = −1 +

µ(a)
.
µ(b)

We consider several values of λ as a comparative statics analysis, but we assume that the DM has a fixed
cost of attention effort.
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Note that since 1 − 2µ(c) = µ(a) + µ(b) − µ(c) ≥ µ(a) and µ(a) ≥ µ(b) ≥ µ(c), it follows
that δ1∗ ≥ δ2∗ ≥ δ3∗ and δ2∗ ≥ δ4∗ . Caplin et al. (2016) show that rational inattention produces a
deterministic consideration set that remains the same across states (i.e., for every A, there
exists φ∗ such that πA (φ∗ | ) = 1 for all ∈ U ). Tables 1 and 2 display the deterministic
considerations set (i.e., φ∗ (A) with probability 1) for different values of δ and menu A. For
instance, the 2 × 1 element of Table 1 is {a}, which corresponds to A = {a, b} and δ ∈ (0, δ4∗ ].
This means that if A = {a, b} and δ ∈ (0, δ4∗ ], then the whole probability mass goes to the
filter φ∗ that is such that φ∗ ({a, b}) = {a}. Table 1 corresponds to the case when δ3∗ ≥ δ4∗
(i.e., µ(b)/µ(c) ≥ µ(a)/µ(b)). Table 2 considers the case when δ4∗ ≥ δ3∗ .
A/δ ∈
{a, b, c}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a, c}

(0, δ4∗ ]
{a}
{a}
{b}
{a}

(δ4∗ , δ3∗ ]
{a, b}
{a, b}
{b}
{a}

(δ3∗ , δ2∗ ]
{a, b}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a}

(δ2∗ , δ1∗ ]
{a, b}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a, c}

(δ1∗ , +∞)
{a, b, c}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a, c}

Table 1 – Consideration sets for different menus A and δ when δ3∗ ≥ δ4∗ .

A/δ ∈
{a, b, c}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a, c}

(0, δ3∗ ]
{a}
{a}
{b}
{a}

(δ3∗ , δ4∗ ]
{a}
{a}
{b, c}
{a}

(δ4∗ , δ2∗ ]
{a, b}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a}

(δ2∗ , δ1∗ ]
{a, b}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a, c}

(δ1∗ , +∞)
{a, b, c}
{a, b}
{b, c}
{a, c}

Table 2 – Consideration sets for different menus A and δ when δ4∗ ≥ δ3∗

Tables 1-2 imply that set-monotonicity is satisfied. Indeed, the deterministic consideration
set described in each column of these tables satisfy the attention filter property described in
Masatlioglu et al. (2012).
Following Caplin et al. (2016), it can be shown that given a consideration set D, the distribution
over choices for this rationally inattentive DM in D is such that the probability of picking y
for a consideration set D is

PD (y) =

µD (y)(|D| + δ) − 1
.
δ
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For instance, if δ ∈ (δ2∗ , δ1∗ ] and A = {a, b, c} (i.e, D = {a, b}), then ρ{a,b,c} (a) = P{a,b} (a),
ρ{a,b,c} (b) = P{a,b} (b), and ρ{a,b,c} (c) = 0. Stability also holds. Since ρA only depends on A via
consideration set D, for δ ≤ δ1∗ , it is trivial to construct a menu independent distribution over
preference orders over X. Hence, ρ generated by this rational inattention model admits a
set-monotone and stable RAUM representation.
When δ > δ1∗ , DMs consider all alternatives. Hence, in this case, since there are only 3
alternatives, ρ admits a RAUM representation if and only if ρ is regular (Block and Marschak,
1960, Falmagne, 1978). That is, ρA (y) ≥ ρX (y) for all A ⊆ X and y ∈ A. Note that
µ{a,b} (a)(2 + δ) − 1
µ(a)(3 + δ) − 1
and ρ{a,b,c} (a) =
. Hence,
ρ{a,b} (a) =
δ
δ
ρ{a,b} (a) − ρ{a,b,c} (a) =

µ(a)µ(c)(δ − δ1∗ )
> 0,
δ(µ(a) + µ(b))

where the last inequality is implied by δ > δ1∗ . Similar inequalities can be derived for all other
menus and options. For the formal construction of π ∗ () see Appendix B.
Caplin et al. (2016) remark informally that the consideration sets produced by the Shannon’s
model of rational inattention satisfy the attention filter property first proposed in Masatlioglu
et al. (2012). Deterministic consideration sets that are attention filters satisfy set-monotonicity
(Cattaneo et al., 2020). However, this statement is only true under certain assumptions
about how the prior is defined and how it changes when menus change. In Example 4, the
deterministic consideration set is indeed an attention filter. However, if we replace µ with
another prior that arbitrarily depends on the menu, this property will not hold in general.
Stability also holds in Example 4. Note that randomness in choice for the rational inattentive
DM is driven by mistakes due to costly attentional effort. If λ = 0, then choice will be
deterministic and consistent with utility maximization. The fact that stability holds in this
setup is entirely due to the fact that Shannon’s model of rational inattention admits an
additive random utility equivalent representation, as stated in Fosgerau et al. (2017). Similarly,
this equivalence will hold only under certain assumptions on the priors and how they change
20

across menus. If priors are fixed, this equivalence holds. In addition, we showed in our
example another way to change priors that also makes this equivalence hold. In other words,
stability holds here because we restrict the dependence of the priors on the menu, hence
making it possible for the implied distribution over preferences π ∗ to be menu-independent as
stability requires.
Not all probabilities of choice generated by Shannon’s rational inattention model admit a
set-monotone and stable RAUM representation. A well-known example in Matějka and
McKay (2015) (see problem 4) exhibits Shannon’s rational inattention model where priors
change across menus such that stability is broken even with full consideration.
We conclude by noting that the example in this section admits neither a RUM representation nor a RAM representation. However, it admits a set-monotone and stable RAUM
representation.

5. Characterization of Set-monotone and Stable RAUM

In this section, we characterize set-monotone and stable RAUM in a form amenable to
(statistical) testing. In particular, we show that to conclude whether a given data set admits
a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation, it suffices to check whether a particular
linear program has a solution. This problem is similar to the one in McFadden and Richter
(1990) that characterizes RUM.
First, we informally describe how to construct the linear program that needs to be solved.
Suppose we have some ρ and some π and want to check whether π is a RAUM representation
of ρ. First, we need to check whether for all menus A and a ∈ A, ρA (a) is a mixture of
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preference-filter-types such that a is considered and is the best among those considered:

ρA (a) =

X

πA (, φ)1 ( a ∈ φ(A), a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} ) .

(,φ)∈U ×Φ

If the choice set is X = {a, b}, preferences U are such that a 1 b and b 2 a, and
there are only 3 feasible filters in Φ: φ1 , φ2 and φ3 such that φ1 ({a}) = φ1 ({a, b}) = {a},
φ2 ({b}) = φ2 ({a, b}) = {b}, φ3 ({a, b}) = {a, b}, then

π{a,b} (1 , φ1 ) + π{a,b} (1 , φ3 ) + π{a,b} (2 , φ1 ) = ρ{a,b} (a).

Thus, iterating over A and a ∈ A, we can construct a set of linear equality constrains that
must be satisfied by π and ρ.
Second, the definition of RAUM requires πA (, φ) = 0 whenever φ(A) = ∅, which is another
linear equality constraint on π. For instance, π{b} (1 , φ1 ) = 0.
Third, each πA sums up to 1, giving us the third set of constraints. For instance,

π{a,b} (1 , φ1 )+π{a,b} (1 , φ2 )+π{a,b} (1 , φ3 )+π{a,b} (2 , φ1 )+π{a,b} (2 , φ2 )+π{a,b} (2 , φ3 ) = 1.

Fourth, π has to be stable. That is,

P

φ (πA (, φ)

− πB (, φ)) = 0 for every A, B ∈ A. For

instance,
π{a} (1 , φ1 ) + π{a} (1 , φ2 ) − π{a,b} (1 , φ1 ) − π{a,b} (1 , φ2 ) = 0.
Thus, we get another set of linear constraints on π.
Finally, to check set-monotonicity note that for A ⊆ B, under stability, πA (φ| ) ≥ πB (φ| )
is equivalent to

πA (φ| )π ∗ () = πA (, φ) ≥ πB (, φ) = πB (φ| )π ∗ ().
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To turn the inequality into equality, we can introduce a slack variable v̄A,B,,φ ≥ 0. As a
result, we get that the final set of equality constraints is of the form

πA (, φ) − πB (, φ) − v̄A,B,,φ = 0.

For example,
π{a} (1 , φ1 ) − π{a,b} (1 , φ1 ) − v̄{a},{a,b},1 ,φ1 = 0.
These are 5 types of linear equality restrictions on v = (π 0 , v̄ 0 )0 , where v̄ = (v̄A,B,,φ )A⊆B∈A,∈U,φ∈Φ
(v̄ enters the first 4 restrictions with zero coefficients). Combining these linear equality restrictions for all menus, choices, filters, and preference orders, we can construct a matrix G that
consists of 0, 1, −1, and does not depend on ρ, and a vector g that depends on ρ. In order to
check whether π is a RAUM representation of ρ it is sufficient to check whether g = Gv. Our
main theorem formalizes the above construction.
Let dρ , dm , and dr denote the number of entries in ρ, the cardinality of 2X \ {∅}, and the
total number of linear restrictions imposed by feasibility, stability, and set-monotonicity on π,
respectively. Also, define g = (ρ0 , 10dm , 00dr )0 ∈ Rdg , where 1dm is the vector of ones of length
dm ; 0dr is the vector of zeros of length dr ; and dg = dρ + dm + dr .
Theorem 1. Given a stochastic choice data set ρ the following are equivalent:
(i) ρ admits a set-monotone and stable RAUM.
(ii) There exists v ∈ Rd+ , d < ∞, such that

g = Gv

where G is a known matrix that consists of −1, 0, 1.
Theorem 1 provides a linear characterization of a set-monotone and stable RAUM. It is
important to note that without stability the problem is quadratic since set-monotonicity is
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imposed on the conditional distribution over filters πA (φ| ). The linearity of our problem
makes it amenable to statistical testing using tools in Deb et al. (2018) as we discuss below.

Computational Aspects of Testing

We have assumed that we observe ρ. In reality, we have to estimate ρ from a sample of
choices. To do this, in our preferred interpretation of RAUM, we need a cross-section of
choices of a population of DMs with choice set variation.19 Once we have the estimator of ρ,
ρ̂, we can use the testing procedure delineated in Deb et al. (2018), which amounts to solve
a (convex)-quadratic problem with linear constraints. Such problems are well-known in the
optimization literature and typically easy to solve (Kitamura and Stoye, 2018, Deb et al.,
2018). The main computational cost can arise in the computation of the matrix G. The matrix
G does not depend on ρ̂n , hence, can be computed once and used for different datasets. Its
size, however, grows exponentially with the size of the choice set X. For instance, for |X| = 6,
G has about 1.8 million rows and 4.4 million columns. Fortunately, G is sparse–for |X| = 6
less than 0.00012 percent of entries of G are nonzero.20 There are dedicated algorithms that
can handle large-scale problems like ours by exploiting sparsity (see, for instance, Benson
et al., 2000, Andersen et al., 2003, Goldfarb and Scheinberg, 2005, Majumdar et al., 2020).21
In the extreme case where the choice set has a continuum of alternatives, such as in the
framework of Kitamura and Stoye (2018), the construction of the analogue matrix for the
special case of RUM can become computational prohibitive. However, this level of complexity
does not typically arise in our setup, as we focus on discrete choice with a moderate choice set
size. Another key difference from Cattaneo et al. (2020) is that we do not require the data
19

One example of such data set is the one collected in Aguiar et al. (2021). In that particular sample,
there are 4099 independent choices from a choice set with |X| = 6 alternatives and |A| = 32 randomly and
exogenously assigned menus.
20
In our simulations, the computation time grows exponentially as well. While for |X| = 3 matrix G is
computed in approximately 3 · 10−4 seconds, for |X| = 6 it takes about 74 minutes.
21
Many of these recently proposed algorithms exploit the fact that quadratic and linear programs can be
rewritten as semidefinite programming problems.
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set to be complete. We show that verifying the conditions on Theorem 1 is necessary and
sufficient to guarantee that there is a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation of the
data set. This means that our methodology can be applied to data sets that do not contain
full variation in menus, such as those collected in Apesteguia and Ballester (2021).22

6. Partial Identification of Preferences and Welfare Analysis

Partial Identification of Preferences

Although RAUM is falsifiable, given that preferences are not homogeneous, it is important
to learn whether RAUM reveals anything about preferences. In this section, we show that
RAUM reveals information about the distribution of preferences in population in some data
sets.
We say that ρ is regular if ρA (a) ≥ ρB (a) for all A ⊆ B and a ∈ A. Otherwise, we call ρ
irregular.
To formalize the notion of revelation of preferences, let Rρ be a set of all set-monotone and
stable RAUM representations of ρ. That is,

Rρ = {π ∈ ∆(U × Φ) : π is set-monotone and stable RAUM rule and ρ admits π} .

Next define the identified set for preference distributions implied by Rρ as

Π(Rρ ) =




π ∗ ∈ ∆(U ) : exists π ∈ Rρ such that π ∗ () =
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X
φ




πA (, φ) for all A,  .


Incompleteness of the data set also leads to substantial decrease in the size of G since it is determined by

|A|.

25

Proposition 2. Π(Rρ ) is a strict subset of ∆(U ) for any irregular ρ. In particular, π ∗ () < 1
for any ∈ U such that b  a for all b ∈ X and some a in

{a ∈ X : ρB (a) > ρA (a), a ∈ A ⊆ B, A, B ∈ A}.

Proposition 2 states that irregular data is always informative about preferences. For example,
if ρ{a,b,c} (a) > ρ{a,b} (a), then we can conclude that a cannot be the worst alternative with
probability 1. There must exist a DM who ranks a above something else. Since set-monotone
and stable RAUM is a generalization of RAM, the conclusion of Proposition 2 is a generalization
of the results in Cattaneo et al. (2020) for heterogeneous preferences.23
We conclude this section by noting that, since RAUM is a strict generalization of RAM, in
general, the distribution over preferences can not be pined down uniquely without imposing
more restrictions. Moreover, if there are several different preference orders that can explain
the observed data set under RAM, then any distribution over these orders can explain the
data set under RAUM. In particular, for regular data sets, nothing can be learned about
preferences under RAUM, since there is no revelation of information about preferences under
RAM (Cattaneo et al., 2020).

Out-of-Sample Predictions and Counterfactual Analysis

Similar to Kitamura and Stoye (2019) who analyzed RUM, we can use our framework to
conduct out-of-sample predictions and counterfactual analysis within the stable and setmonotone RAUM framework. In particular, we are interested in (i) predicting the choices of
DMs in menus that are not observed in the data; and (ii) measuring welfare losses due to
inattention as the fraction of individuals that do not achieve their first best due to limited
consideration (i.e. the first best is the counterfactual situation where DMs consider the whole
23

Note that Π(Rρ ) and ∆(U ) are closed sets, hence, the difference between ∆(U ) and Π(Rρ ) has a positive
Lebesgue measure.
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menu instead of its subsets).
By Theorem 1, we know that a given data set ρ, defined on the collection of menus A, admits
a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation π if and only if there exists v ∈ Rd+ such
that
g = Gv.

(1)

Recall that if v is a solution to Equation (1), then the first |U | · (2|X| − 1) · |Φ| components of
v correspond to the set-monotone and stable RAUM rule. We will abuse notation and use π v
to denote this rule. This π v includes rules for all menus (even those that are not observed in
the data). Thus, the set of solutions to Equation (1) characterizes all possible set-monotone
and stable RAUM rules that can be admitted by given ρ.
To make out-of-sample predictions, note that given v (hence, π v ) that solves Equation (1),
πAv (, φ) will be a fraction of DMs in the population with preferences  and filter φ for any
A that is consistent with ρ. So we can compute the maximal out-of-sample probability of
observing a from A 6∈ A (and A ⊆ X) that was not observed in ρ as

max
v
π

X

πAv (, φ)1 ( a ∈ φ(A), a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} ) ,

(,φ)∈U ×Φ

s.t. Gv = g.

The minimal out-of-sample probability of observing a from A 6∈ A (and A ⊆ X) can be
computed in the same way by replacing the max by the min operator.
Next, to measure welfare losses due to inattention as the fraction of individuals that do not
achieve their first best due to limited consideration, for any A ∈ A such that

P

0

define

∆PAc (π v ) =

X



πAv (, φ) 1 ( a ∈ A, a  b, ∀b ∈ A \ {a} )

a∈A,φ∈Φ,∈U



− 1 ( a ∈ φ(A), a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} ) .
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πA (0 , φ) 6= 0

∆PA (π v ) measures that counterfactual fraction of DMs endowed with menu A who are strictly
better off from considering all available alternatives in menu A. Hence,

max ∆PA (π v )

v∈Rd+

s.t. Gv = g

will be the maximal fraction of DMs, who faced menu A, that would be better off if they
consider all alternatives in A. If one is interested in the total effect it suffices to replace
∆PA (v) by

P

A∈A

∆PA (v) in the last optimization. Similar to the out-of-sample predictions,

the lower bound of ∆PA (π v ) can be computed by replacing the max by the min operator.
Note that the counterfactual fully attentive behavior, assuming that each DM is fully attentive
or considers the whole menu, is equivalent to the DMs behaving consistently with RUM
governed by the true preference distribution (under our preferred interpretation of RAUM)
π ∗,v , where π ∗,v () =

P

φ

π v (, φ).

We highlight that our ordinal approach puts no restriction on the random utility distribution.
We do not need to integrate over (unknown) distributions of parameters of high order
polynomial approximations of the utility function or the consideration probability. Instead, by
taking a purely revealed preference approach, our out-of-sample predictions and counterfactual
welfare analysis require solving a linear program that delivers sharp bounds (i.e., a point is
within bounds if and only if there exists a data generating process that is consistent with
observed data and the point).
We finish this section by remaking that U can be restricted to any subset of linear orders
exhibiting some property (e.g., single-crossing, Apesteguia et al., 2017, or expected utility,
Kashaev and Aguiar, 2021). Our theory applies to these restrictions without changes. These
restrictions, when valid, can improve the informativeness of the bounds studied in this section.
However, we present our results for the unrestricted U to maximize generality.
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7. Conclusions

We have extended the classical stochastic revealed preference methodology in McFadden
and Richter (1990) for finite sets to allow for limited consideration. Our model allows
for heterogeneous preferences that are correlated with consideration sets. We assume that
consideration satisfies the set-monotonicity assumption of Cattaneo et al. (2020). We also
introduce a new condition, called stability, that requires the marginal distribution of preferences
to be independent of menus. We show that this new restriction is satisfied in many theoretical
and empirical settings. The proposed model and conditions are amenable to statistical testing
using the procedure proposed in Deb et al. (2018).
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A. Proofs

A.1. Proof of Proposition 1

Since any ρ can be completed, it is sufficient to establish validity of statements (i) and (ii) for
complete stochastic data sets (i.e., A = 2X \ {∅}).
Proof of (i). Fix any complete ρ and let πA (φ| ) = ρA (a)1 ( φ(A) = {a} ) for all a, A, .
Then ρ admits a stable RAUM representation πA (φ| )π ∗ (), where π ∗ is any element in
∆(U ).
Proof of (ii). Fix any complete ρ. For any  and A let a,A be the best element in A
according to  and κ,A =

P

0 ∈U

1 ( a,A = a0 ,A ) be the number of preference orders for

which a,A is also the best. Take πA () = ρA (a,A )/κ,A . Then ρ admits a set-monotone
RAUM representation πA (φ| )πA (), where πA (φ| ) = 1 ( φ(A) = A ) for all  and A.
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Proof of (iii). To prove (iii) we will construct an incomplete data set (i.e., A =
6 2X \ {∅}) that
does not admit a set-monotone and stable RAUM. Let X = {a, b, c, d} and

A = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, d}, {a, b, d}, {a, c, d}, {b, c, d}}.

Suppose the observed ρ is as follows
Menu {a, b}

{a, c}

{b, d}

{a, b, d}

{a, c, d}

{b, c, d}

ρA (a)

1

1

-

0

0

-

ρA (b)

0

-

1

1

-

αb

ρA (c)

-

0

-

-

1

αc

ρA (d)

-

-

0

0

0

αd

where αd > 0. (Columns in the above matrix correspond to different menus. For instance,
the third element of the second row is ρ{b,d} (b).) By way of contradiction assume that ρ
admits a set-monotone and stable RAUM. We will abuse notation and associate filters with
consideration sets they imply. For example, if φ1 is such that φ1 (A) = B we will write
πA (, B) instead of πA (, φ). Consider menus {a, b} and {a, b, d}. Note that

0 = ρ{a,b} (b) =

X

π{a,b} (, {b}) + π{a,b} (, {a, b})1 ( b  a ) ,



1 = ρ{a,b,d} (b) =

X

π{a,b,d} (, {b}) + π{a,b,d} (, {a, b})1 ( b  a )



+ π{a,b,d} (, {b, d})1 ( b  d ) + π{a,b,d} (, {a, b, d})1 ( b  a, d ) .

Subtracting the first equation from the second one, we get that

1=

X

[π{a,b,d} (, {b}) − π{a,b} (, {b})] + [π{a,b,d} (, {a, b}) − π{a,b} (, {a, b})]1 ( b  a )



+ π{a,b,d} (, {b, d})1 ( b  d ) + π{a,b,d} (, {a, b, d})1 ( b  a, d ) .

36

Set-monotonicity of πA and stability of preferences then imply that

1≤

X

π{a,b,d} (, {b, d})1 ( b  d ) + π{a,b,d} (, {a, b, d})1 ( b  a, d ) .



Since

P P


D⊆{a,b,d}

π{a,b,d} (, D) = 1, we can conclude that the distribution over preferences

π ∗ is such that b  d with probability 1. If we apply the above arguments to ρ{a,c} (c) and
ρ{a,c,d} (c), we can deduce that c  d with probability 1. Thus, with probability 1, d is never
picked if it is considered together with b or c. Hence, in menu {b, c, d} it can be picked with
positive probability (i.e. αd > 0) if and only if set {d} is considered with positive probability.
The later is not possible since π{b,c,d} (, {d}) ≤ π{b,d} (, {d}) ≤ ρ{b,d} (d) = 0 (d is never
picked in menu {b, d}). The contradiction completes the proof.

A.2. Proof of Theorem 1

Assume that π is a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation of possibly incomplete
ρ. Let dm = 2X \ {∅} × U × Φ and Aa = {(a, A) ∈ X × A : a ∈ A}. Fix any one-to-one
mapping i1 : Aa → {1, 2, . . . , |Aa |} that maps a pair (a, A) to a corresponding element of
vector ρ. Also fix any one-to-one i2 : 2X \ {∅} × U × Φ → {1, 2, . . . , dm }. Let B be a matrix
of size |Aa | × dm such that the (k, l)-element of it, Bk,l , is defined as follows




1 ( a

Bk,l = 


0,

 b, ∀b ∈ φ(A) \ {a} ) , if k = i1 ((a, A)), l = i2 (A, , φ) for some , φ, (a, A) ∈ Aa
otherwise

Hence, in matrix notation, if ρ admits a RAUM representation, then

ρ = Bπ,

where π = (πA (, φ))i2 (A,,φ) .

37

.

The rest of the restrictions will be imposed on all menus (including the ones that are not
present in A). These restrictions do not use any data. First, we want to capture the fact that
πA (·, ·) is a probability distribution and needs to sum up to 1. For any A ∈ 2X \ {∅}, let an
i2 (A, , φ) element of a row of matrix O to be 1 for all  and φ and to be zero otherwise.
Hence, the constraint can be written as

Oπ = 1dm ,

where O is the matrix of size dm × d1 .
The next set of restrictions captures feasibility: πA (, φ) = 0 whenever φ(A) = ∅. Let
d2 =

P

A,,φ

1 ( φ(A) = ∅ ). Then the feasibility constraint can be written as

F π = 0,

where F is a matrix of 0/1 that picks i2 (A, , φ) elements of π that should be set to zero
because of feasibility.
Next we want to rewrite the definition of stability in the matrix form. Note that stability can
be written as

P

φ

πA (, φ) =

P

φ

πB (, φ) for all A, B. Fix any A, B, and . Let ιA,B, be a

vector of length d such that

ιA,B,
= 1 ( ∃φ : k = i2 (A, , φ) ) − 1 ( ∃φ : k = i2 (B, , φ) ) .
k
n

Take a collection of vectors ιA,B,
k

o
A,B,

and remove all linearly dependent or zero vectors.

Let every element of what is left to be a row of a matrix S. Then, stability is equivalent to

Sπ = 0.

Finally, we want to build a matrix representation of set-monotonicity. Note that, under
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stability, πA (φ| ) ≥ πB (φ| ) is equivalent to πA (, φ) ≥ πB (, φ). Hence, similarly to
stability, fix any A, B, , φ such that A ⊆ B, A =
6 B, and let ιA,B,,φ be a vector of length d
such that
ιkA,B,,φ = 1 ( k = i2 (A, , φ) ) − 1 ( k = i2 (B, , φ) ) .
Similarly to matrix S we can use vectors

n

ιA,B,,φ
k

o

to build matrix M such that set-

monotonicity is equivalent to
M π = v̄,
where v̄ is a component-wise nonnegative vector. Define G as


G=



















B

0 

O

0

F

0

S

0

M −I







.








As a result, if ρ admits a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation, then the system
g = Gv has a component-wise nonnegative solution (π 0 , v̄ 0 )0 .
Now suppose g = Gv has a component-wise nonnegative solution (π 0 , v̄ 0 )0 , we want to show
that this π is a set-monotone and stable RAUM representation of ρ. By the definition of
G, π is a complete (i.e., includes all possible menus) collection of distributions over U × Φ.
Moreover, the constructed π is set-monotone and stable and can generate the observed ρ.

A.3. Proof of Proposition 2

Towards a contradiction assume Πρ = ∆(U ). If ρ is irregular, then there exist A, B ∈ A,
A ⊆ B, and a ∈ A such that  ≡ ρB (a) − ρA (a) > 0. Since by assumption Πρ = ∆(U ), take
any π such that a is the worst with probability 1. If φ∗ is such that φ∗ (A) = φ∗ (B) = {a},
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then

ρB (a) =

XX


πB (φ| )π()1 ( a  b, ∀b ∈ φ(B), a ∈ φ(B) ) =

X

πB (φ∗ | )π().



φ

Similarly,
ρA (a) =

X

πA (φ∗ | )π().



Taking the difference between these two equations we get that

0<=

[πB (φ∗ | ) − πA (φ∗ | )]π() ≤ 0,

X


where the last inequality follows from set-monotonicity. This contradiction completes the
proof.

B. Omitted Details from Example 4

There are 4 possible non-singleton menus: {a, b, c}, {a, b}, {b, c}, and {a, c}. Given δ and A,
let Dδ,A be the deterministic consideration set.
Case 1, A = {a, b, c}. Theorem 1 in Caplin et al. (2016) implies that if µ(c) > 1/(3 + δ) (i.e.,
δ > −3 + 1/µ(c) = δ1∗ ), then Dδ,A = A. If δ < δ1∗ and

µ(b) ≥

µ(a) + µ(b)
> µ(c)
2+δ

(i.e., δ4∗ ≤ δ < δ1∗ ), then Dδ,A = {a, b}. Finally, if

µ(a) ≥

µ(a)
> µ(b)
1+δ
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(i.e., δ < δ4∗ ), then the consideration set is {a}.
Case 2, A = {a, b}. Applying the same Theorem 1 in Caplin et al. (2016) we can obtain
that if
µA (b) =

µ(b)
> 1/(2 + δ)
µ(a) + µ(b)

(i.e., δ > −1 + µ(a)/µ(b) = δ4∗ ), then Dδ,A = {a, b}, and Dδ,A = {a} otherwise.
Case 3, A = {b, c}. Similarly to Case 2, if

µA (b) =

µ(c)
> 1/(2 + δ)
µ(b) + µ(c)

(i.e., δ > −1 + µ(b)/µ(c) = δe∗ ), then Dδ,A = {b, c}, and Dδ,A = {b} otherwise.
Case 4, A = {a, c}. If
µA (c) =

µ(c)
> 1/(2 + δ)
µ(a) + µ(c)

(i.e., δ > −1 + µ(a)/µ(c) = δ2∗ ), then Dδ,A = {a, c}, and Dδ,A = {a} otherwise.
Given that 1 − 2µ(c) = µ(a) + (µ(b) − µ(c) ≥ µ(a) and µ(a) ≥ µ(b) ≥ µ(c), it follows that
δ1∗ ≥ δ2∗ ≥ δ3∗ and δ2∗ ≥ δ4∗ . Tables 1 and 2 summarize the above derivations for different values
of δ and menu A. Table 1 corresponds to the case when δ3∗ ≥ δ4∗ . Table 2 considers the case
when δ4∗ < δ3∗ .
Next, we compute the implied by the model probabilities of choosing different options.
Theorem 1 in Caplin et al. (2016) implies that the probability that y ∈ Dδ,A is chosen from
y ∈ Dδ,A satisfies
PDδ,A (y) =

µDδ,A (y(|Dδ,A | + δ) − 1)
.
δ

Assume that δ3∗ > δ4∗ (the opposite case leads to the same conclusion). The following table
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displays PDδ,A (a).
A/δ ∈

(0, δ4∗ ]

(δ4∗ , δ3∗ ]

(δ3∗ , δ2∗ ]

(δ2∗ , δ1∗ ]

(δ1∗ , +∞)

{a, b, c}

1

P{a,b} (a)

P{a,b} (a)

P{a,b} (a)

P{a,b,c} (a)

{a, b}

1

P{a,b} (a)

P{a,b} (a)

P{a,b} (a)

P{a,b} (a)

{a, c}

1

1

1

P{a,c} (a)

P{a,c} (a)

For options b and c the tables are
A/δ ∈

(0, δ4∗ ]

(δ4∗ , δ3∗ ]

(δ3∗ , δ2∗ ]

(δ2∗ , δ1∗ ]

(δ1∗ , +∞)

{a, b, c}

0

P{a,b} (b)

P{a,b} (b)

P{a,b} (b)

P{a,b,c} (b)

{a, b}

0

P{a,b} (b)

P{a,b} (b)

P{a,b} (b)

P{a,b} (b)

{b, c}

1

1

P{b,c} (b)

P{b,c} (b)

P{b,c} (b)

and
A/δ ∈

(0, δ4∗ ]

(δ4∗ , δ3∗ ]

(δ3∗ , δ2∗ ]

(δ2∗ , δ1∗ ]

(δ1∗ , +∞)

{a, b, c}

0

0

0

0

P{a,b,c} (c)

{b, c}

0

0

P{b,c} (c)

P{b,c} (c)

P{b,c} (c)

{a, c}

0

0

0

P{a,c} (c)

P{a,c} (c)

Note that since P{a,b,c} (a) < P{a,b} (a) ≤ P{a,c} (a), P{a,b,c} (b) < P{a,b} (b) ≤ P{b,c} (b), and
P{a,b,c} (c) < P{a,c} (c) ≤ P{b,c} (c), the computes distributions do not violate regularity for all
values of δ and all menus A.
If y1 y2 y3 is such that y1 y1 y2 y3 y2 y1 y2 y3 y3 , then one can verify that the following π ∗ is a
stable distribution that together with the deterministic consideration set is consistent with
observed choices:
(δ − δ1∗ + κac ) µ(a)µ(b)
≥ 0,
(µ(b) + µ(c))
δ
(δ − δ1∗ + κac ) µ(a)µ(c)
π ∗ (acb ) =
≥ 0,
(µ(b) + µ(c))
δ
π ∗ (abc ) =
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(δ − δ1∗ + κbc ) µ(a)µ(b)
≥ 0,
(µ(a) + µ(c))
δ
(δ − δ1∗ + κbc ) µ(b)µ(c)
∗
π (bca ) =
≥ 0,
(µ(a) + µ(c))
δ
(δ − δ1∗ ) µ(a)µ(c)
∗
π (cab ) =
≥ 0,
(µ(a) + µ(b))
δ
π ∗ (bac ) =

π ∗ (cba ) = 1 − (π1 + π2 + π3 + π4 + π5 ) =

(δ − δ1∗ ) µ(b)µ(c)
≥ 0,
(µ(a) + µ(b))
δ

where κac = 1/µ(c) − 1/µ(a) ≥ 0 and κbc = 1/µ(c) − 1/µ(b) ≥ 0.

C. Omitted Details from Section 4

In this appendix, we verify the general formula for the attention-index models in Example 2 for
the representation of the logit attention model (Brady and Rehbeck, 2016) and the elimination
by aspects (Tversky, 1972, Aguiar, 2017). Recall that
P

πA (φ| ) = P

η (φ(A) ∪ B)
,
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (C ∪ B)

B⊆X\g̃(A)

C∈2A \{∅}

P

for a known g̃ : 2X → 2X .
To prove the relation for the logit attention model, note that if g̃(A) = X for all A, then the
probability of considering D = φ(A) in menu A, m,A (D), is equal to
P

m,A (D) = πA (φ| ) = P

η (D ∪ B)
η (D)
=P
.
B⊆X\X η (C ∪ B)
C∈2A \{∅} η (C)

B⊆X\X

C∈2A \{∅}

P

The latter corresponds to the consideration rule in Brady and Rehbeck (2016), since, by
construction, η (∅) = 0.
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Similarly, by definition, the consideration rule of the elimination by aspects is
η (C)

X

m,A (D) =

P

K⊆X : K∩A6=∅

C⊆X : C∩A=D

η (K)

.

From
X

X

η (K) =

K : K∩A6=∅

X

η (C ∪ B)

B⊆X\A C⊆A, C6=∅

and
X

X

η (C) =

C : C∩A=D

η (D ∪ B),

B⊆X\A

it follows that
P

m,A (D) = P

η (D ∪ B)
.
B⊆X\A η (C ∪ B)

B⊆X\A

C∈2A \{∅}

P

Hence, g̃(A) = A generates the elimination by aspects consideration rule.
Now we establish a sufficient condition on the mapping g̃ that imply set-monotonicity on the
induced π rule.
Lemma 1. If g̃(A) ⊆ g̃(A0 ) and g̃(A0 ) \ g̃(A) ⊆ A0 \ A for all A ⊆ A0 , then
P

πA (φ| ) = P

η (φ(A) ∪ B)
,
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (C ∪ B)

B⊆X\g̃(A)

C∈2A \{∅}

P

satisfies set-monotonicity.
This restriction on g̃ is not exhausted by the logit attention and the elimination by aspects
models. For example, g̃(A) = A \ {a∗ , b∗ } for all A ∈ A; and g̃(A) = X \ {a∗ , b∗ } for all A ∈ A,
where {a∗ , b∗ } ⊆ X are fixed items both satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1. The extent to
which these new mappings g̃ induce an empirically relevant consideration rules is outside the
scope of this paper.
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Proof of Lemma 1.

Proof. Let D = φ(A) = φ(A0 ) for A ⊆ A0 . First, note that

X

X

η (D ∪ B) −

η (D ∪ B) ≥ 0

(2)

B⊆X\g̃(A0 )

B⊆X\g̃(A)

since X \ g̃(A0 ) ⊆ X \ g̃(A). Second, let L = A0 \ A and T = g̃(A0 ) \ g̃(A), and note that

X

X

X

η (C ∪ B) =

X

C∈2A0 \{∅}

B⊆X\g̃(A0 )

X

η (C ∪ B) =

X

η (C ∪ B) +

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A0 )

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A)

X

X

X

X

X

η (C ∪ B ∪ K),

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) K⊆T,K6=∅

X

η (C ∪ B) +

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A0 )

X

X

η (C ∪ B ∪ K).

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) K⊆L,K6=∅

As a result, since we assume that T ⊆ L, we can conclude that

X

X

C∈2A0 \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A0 )

X

X

η (C ∪ B) −

X

X

η (C ∪ B) =

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A)

X

η (C ∪ B ∪ K) ≥ 0

(3)

C∈2A \{∅} B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) K⊆L\T,K6=∅

Hence,
0
η (φ(A) ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) η (φ(A ) ∪ B)
πA (φ| ) − πA0 (φ| ) = P
−P
≥
P
P
C∈2A \{∅}
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (C ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) η (C ∪ B)
C∈2A0 \{∅}

P

P

B⊆X\g̃(A)

η (φ(A) ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (φ(A) ∪ B)
−P
≥
≥P
P
P
C∈2A \{∅}
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (C ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) η (C ∪ B)
C∈2A0 \{∅}
P

P

B⊆X\g̃(A)

η (φ(A) ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A) η (φ(A) ∪ B)
≥P
−P
= 0,
P
P
B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) η (C ∪ B)
B⊆X\g̃(A0 ) η (C ∪ B)
C∈2A0 \{∅}
C∈2A0 \{∅}
P

P

B⊆X\g̃(A)

where the first inequality follows from Equation (2) and the second one follows from Equation
(3).
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